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Abstract
I examine the welfare effects of emission permit trading in an economy where the 
use of energy in production generates welfare-harming emissions, there is a regu-
lator that sets industry-specific emission permits and the industries influence the 
regulator by paying political contributions. I show that policy with nontraded emis-
sion permits establishes aggregate production efficiency. Emission permit trading 
hampers efficiency and welfare by increasing the use of emitting inputs in dirty and 
decreasing that in clean industries.
Keywords Emission caps · Emission permit trading · Command-and-control 
instruments · Common agency games
JEL Classification H23 · F15 · Q53
1 Introduction
In this study, I examine endogenous environmental policy with the issue and trad-
ing of emission permits. Because there is in general no international regulator that 
would control emissions-based externality by efficient tax instruments, international 
environmental policy is commonly delegated to an authority that is subject to lobby-
ing. Thus, it is instructive to examine how emission permit trading affects emissions 
and aggregate welfare.
This study is motivated by the following experience. In the environmental pol-
icy of the European Union (EU), command-and-control instruments dominate over 
incentive-based instruments (Wråke et  al. 2012), because they do not involve fis-
cal policy. The command-and-control policy can be implemented in three stages 
(Goulder 2013). First, the regulator specifies total pollution allowed for all the facili-
ties in the regulatory program. Second, the regulator distributes the allowances. 
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Third, the system provides for trading in the allowances. This study considers the 
usefulness of the third stage.
In the EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), lobbying by the interest groups 
plays an important role. Binder and Neumayer (2005) and Fredriksson et al. (2005) 
examine lobbying by environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGO). In 
contrast, I do not make a sharp division between household and producer lobbies. I 
rather assume that emissions are by-products of (carbon) energy and that an indus-
trial lobby represents households that receive income from the same industry. Then, 
each lobby cares about both aggregate emissions (as a consumer) and the needs for 
the industry. Gullberg (2008) considers whether interest groups lobby towards their 
friends or foes. In my approach, there is no such distinction; each industrial lobby 
cares about the emissions of all industries, not only those of its own.
In the EU-ETS, many emission permits are auctioned and not granted free of 
charge to the industries. Because the combination of lobbying and auctions would 
lead to a very complicated game theoretic model, I have to leave that extension for 
future studies.
Caplan and Silva (2005) examine emission permit trading in a federation of regions, 
showing that Pareto efficiency can be established with the help of inter-regional redis-
tributive transfers. Holtsmark and Sommervoll (2012) consider emission permit trad-
ing when the (local) governments grant permits for the domestic firms. They show 
that the anticipation of such trading changes the governments’ behavior so that emis-
sions actually increase, decreasing efficiency. I assume, on the contrary, that there are 
no redistributive transfers and that there is a regulator that grants emission permits. 
Hintermann (2011) and Meunier (2011) consider the imperfections in the emission 
permit markets, while I show that severe coordination problems appear between the 
regulator and the industries already with competitive markets.
To examine the problem of the usefulness of emission permit trading, I construct 
a game theoretic model where a self-interested regulator grants emission permits for 
industries, as being influenced by the lobbies that represent the income earners in 
those industries. I apply common agency theory, where several principals influence 
a single agent by offering contributions that are conditional on the latter’s behavior 
(cf. Grossman and Helpman 1994; Dixit et al. 1997; Aidt 1998).
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
structure of the economy. Sections 3 and 4 examine environmental policy with non-
traded and traded permits, respectively, and section 5 considers the effects of emis-
sion permit trading. Section 6 summarizes the results.
2  The economy
2.1  Production
There is a “continuum” of industries i ∈ [0, 1] that produce the same numeraire good 
from carbon energy mi with decreasing returns to scale:
(1)gi(mi), g�i > 0, g��i < 0, i ∈ [0, 1].
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This is the simplest production setup for the purposes of this study and it can be 
motivated, e.g., as follows. Every industry i ∈ [0, 1] produces its output gi from car-
bon energy mi and fixed inputs (e.g., labor, land) according to neoclassical technol-
ogy. Because the economy is small and open, the relative prices of the industries 
are exogenously determined from abroad. In that case, the outputs of the industries 
i ∈ [0, 1] can be aggregated into one good, the price of which can be normalized at 
unity in the model.
There is also an energy sector that transforms natural resources into carbon energy 
at a constant unit cost x in terms of the numeraire good. Then, in industry i, revenue is 
given by fi(mi) ≐ gi(mi) − xmi , and there is a fixed maximum mi for the use of input mi
:
The maximum mi acts as an outside option in the common agency game. By (1) and 
(2), I can define the revenue function
I choose the units so that the use of carbon energy mi generates emissions in one-to-
one proportion. Then, aggregate emissions are given by
2.2  Utility
The representative household in industry i (hereafter called industry i, for convenience) 
consumes all income in that industry and acts as a lobby for that industry. To elim-
inate aggregation problems and distributional concerns from the model and to focus 
only on aggregate production efficiency, I follow Grossman and Helpman (1994) and 
Aidt (1998) and assume that all industries i ∈ [0, 1] have the same marginal utility of 
income. Then, each industry i ∈ [0, 1] derives utility from its consumption ci and the 
emissions of all industries, 퐦 ≐ {mk| ∈ [0, 1]} , through the function
where Di(퐦) is the damage of the emissions 퐦 for industry i in terms of the numer-
aire good. Then, aggregate damage in the economy is given by
I take the utilitarian welfare function—i.e., the sum of the utilities (5) of all indus-
tries k ∈ [0, 1]—to represent social welfare, for convenience [cf. (6)]:
(2)mi ≤ mi ≐ argmaxmi fi(mi) = argmaxmi [gi(mi) − xmi].
(3)f (mi), mi ≤ mi, f �i ||mi<mi= g�i − x > 0, f ��i = g��i < 0.
(4)M ≐ �
1
0
midi.
(5)Ui = ci − Di(퐦),
𝜕Di
𝜕mk
> 0 for k ∈ [0, 1],
(6)D(퐦) ≐ �
1
0
Dk(퐦)dk.
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Because all industries produce the same numeraire good, the Pareto optimum is 
the allocation of inputs 퐦 that maximizes social welfare (7) when all industries 
k ∈ [0, 1] consume their revenue (3), ck = fk(mk):
Thus, at the Pareto optimum, the marginal product fi of the emitting input mi of any 
industry i ∈ [0, 1] is equal to the marginal aggregate damage 휕D
휕mi
 of that input.
2.3  Regulation
Damage D(퐦) causes externality that must be controlled by environmental policy. 
I examine this in the setup of a common agency game (cf. Grossman and Help-
man 1994; Dixit et al. 1997; Aidt 1998) as follows. There is a regulator that grants 
industry-specific emission permits 퐌 ≐ {Mi|i ∈ [0, 1]} . If industry i joins the regu-
latory program, then it must accept the regulator’s policy, but if it does not join and 
remains as a free rider, then it pays a constant penalty ni > 0 to the other indus-
tries. Without the retaliation against free traders, the regulatory program could not 
be implemented. In a common agency game, the possibility of avoiding regulation 
restricts the regulator’s policy set, but in equilibrium all industries participate in the 
program. Thus, total emissions M are always equal to the sum of emission permits:
Because every industry i ∈ [0, 1] attempts to influence the regulator by paying politi-
cal contributions Ri to the latter, the regulator’s total income is
I assume that the regulator has no other income, for simplicity.
In line with Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Finkelstain and Kislev (1997), 
I assume the following. The incumbent regulator expects that high social welfare 
improves its likelihood to stay in power. As a result of this, it maximizes a weighted 
sum of social welfare (7) and private benefit (10),
(7)W ≐ �
1
0
Ukdk = �
1
0
[ck − Dk(퐦)]dk = �
1
0
ckdk − D(퐦).
(8)
퐦 = arg max
퐦 s.t. 퐜퐤=퐟퐤(퐦퐤) f퐨퐫 퐤∈ [ퟎ,ퟏ]
W = argmax
퐦
[
∫
1
0
fk(mk)dk − D(퐦)
]
⇔
휕W
휕mi
= f �
i
−
휕D
휕mi
= 0 ⇔ f �
i
=
휕D
휕mi
for i ∈ [0, 1].
(9)M = ∫
1
0
Midi.
(10)R ≐ �
1
0
Ridi.
1 3
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 
where the constant z represents the preference of the regulator for political contribu-
tions R relative to social welfare W.
3  Nontraded permits
Nontraded permits 퐌 determine emissions 퐦 directly: 퐦 =퐌 . Then, each industry 
i ∈ [0, 1] consumes its revenue fi(mi) = fi(Mi) [cf. (3)] minus its contributions to the 
regulator, RiN,1
and the regulator’s utility (11) can be written as follows:
Emission policy with nontraded permits is determined by the two-stage game:
 (i) Each industry i ∈ [0, 1] sets its political contributions RiN conditional on the 
regulator’s policy 퐌 ≐ {Mi| i ∈ [0, 1]}.
 (ii) The regulator sets the emission permits 퐌 , noting aggregate emissions (9) and 
consumption (12) in all industries i ∈ [0, 1].
3.1  Regulation
According to Dixit et al. (1997), a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the game 
is a set of a policy 퐌 and contribution schedules RiN(퐌) for i ∈ [0, 1] such that the 
following conditions (a)–(d) hold true:
(a) The contributions RiN of industries i ∈ [0, 1] are non-negative but no more than 
the income of that industry.
(b) Industry i cannot have a feasible strategy RiN(퐌) that yields it higher utility UiN 
than in equilibrium (cf. 퐦 =퐌 ): 
(11)Ω ≐ W + zR = �
1
0
(ck + zRk)dk − D(퐦), z > 0,
(12)ciN ≐ fi(Mi) − RiN ,
(13)ΩN = ∫
1
0
[
fi(Mk) − RkN(퐌) + zRkN
]
dk − D(퐌).
(14)
Mi = arg max
Mi s.t. (5),(12)
UiN = arg max
Mi s.t. (12)
[ciN − Di(퐌]
= argmax
Mi
[fi(Mi) − RiN(퐌) − Di(퐌)].
1 Subscript N denotes the case of no emission permit trading.
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(c) The regulator cannot have a policy 퐌 that yields it higher utility (13) than in 
equilibrium: 
(d) Industry i provides the regulator at least with the level of utility than in the case 
it offers nothing ( RiN = 0 ), and the regulator responds optimally given the con-
tribution functions of the other industries, 
3.2  Equilibrium
If industry i ∈ [0, 1] does not join the regulatory program, then it has no contribu-
tions to pay, RiN = 0 , and it uses the maximum input mi [cf. (3)] and consumer rev-
enue fi(mi) minus its penalty ni:
If it joins the program, then it pays contributions RiN(퐌) and behaves according to 
(14) with the first-order conditions
Thus, in equilibrium, the change in the contributions of industry i, RiN , due to a 
change in the instrument Mi equals the effect of that instrument on the net revenue of 
that industry, f �
i
(Mi) −
휕Di
휕Mi
(퐌) . These contribution schedules are locally truthful. 
This concept can be extended to a globally truthful contribution schedule RiN(퐌) 
that represents the preferences of industry i at all relevant policy points as follows 
[cf. (16), (17)]:
where the integration constant fi(mi) − ni is the opportunity income for industry i as 
a free rider [cf. (16)].
By (6) and (18), the equilibrium conditions (15) are equivalent to
(15)
퐌 = argmax
퐌
ΩN = argmax
퐌 ∫
1
0
[
fi(Mk) + (z − 1)RkN(퐌)
]
dk − D(퐌).
ΩN ≥ max
퐌
ΩN
||RiN=0.
(16)ciN||RiN=0= fi(mi) − ni.
(17)
𝜕UiN
𝜕Mi
= f �
i
−
𝜕RiN
𝜕Mi
−
𝜕Di
𝜕mi
= 0
⇔
𝜕RiN
𝜕Mi
(퐌) = f �
i
(Mi) −
𝜕Di
𝜕mi
(퐌) for RiN > 0 and i ∈ [0, 1].
(18)
RiN(퐌) = �
휕RiN
휕Mi
(퐌)dMi = max
{
fi(Mi) − Di(퐌) − [fi(mi) − ni], 0
}
with
휕RiN
휕Mi
= f �
i
−
휕Di
휕mi
and
휕RiN
휕Mk
= −
휕Di
휕mk
for k ≠ i,
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Because this result is the same as (8), it can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1 The use of nontraded industry-specific emission permits establishes 
Pareto optimum.
This proposition is in line with the result of Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit 
et  al. (1997) and Aidt (1998) on the existence of an efficient lobbying outcome: 
when all industries i ∈ [0, 1] are represented by an interest group and each individ-
ual earns income only in one industry, all individuals are represented by an interest 
group.2
4  Traded permits
The introduction of emission permit trading extends the extensive form game of 
the preceding sector to four stages by incorporating the emission permit market 
and individual firms as new players into the model. This is because the lobby called 
industry i, which represents income earners in that industry, cannot control individ-
ual firms operating in it. These firms ignore the effects of their production on aggre-
gate emissions and take both emission permits Mi and the price for emission permits 
p as given. Emission policy with traded permits is then determined by the four-stage 
extensive form game as follows:
 (i) Each industry i ∈ [0, 1] sets its political contributions RiT (퐌) conditional on 
the regulator’s policy 퐌.3
 (ii) The regulator sets the emission permits 퐌.
 (iii) The emission permit market adjusts the price p for emission permits to set 
aggregate demand ∫ 1
0
mkdk equal to the aggregate supply (9): 
(19)
휕ΩN
휕Mi
= f �
i
+ (z − 1)�
1
0
휕RkN
휕Mi
dk −
휕D
휕mi
= f �
i
+ (z − 1)
휕RiN
휕Mi
−
휕Di
휕mi
+ �k≠i
[
(z − 1)
휕RkN
휕Mi
−
휕Dk
휕mi
]
dk
= z
휕RiN
휕Mi
+ z�k≠i
휕RkN
휕Mi
dk = z�
1
0
휕RkN
휕Mi
dk = z
(
f �
i
− �
1
0
휕Dk
휕mi
dk
)
= z
(
f �
i
−
휕D
휕mi
)
= 0 ⇔ f �
i
=
휕D
휕mi
for i ∈ [0, 1].
2 Cf. Oates and Portney (Oates and Portney 2003,  p. 335). I have excluded the regulator from the 
social welfare function W by the assumption that it does not receive income from any of the industries 
i ∈ [0, 1] , for simplicity.
3 Subscript T denotes the case of emission permit trading.
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 (iv) Firms produce using carbon energy mi.
This game is solved in reverse order in the following subsections.
4.1  Firms
The representative firm in industry i receives emission permits Mi from the regula-
tor and faces the price p for emission permits in the market. It purchases the quantity 
mi −Mi of those in the case of shortage mi > Mi and sells the quantity Mi − mi of those 
in the case of surplus Mi > mi at the price p to produce revenue fi(mi) . Thus, for a 
given price p and given permits Mi , it uses carbon energy mi to maximize its profit
This leads to the equilibrium profit and the first-order condition as follows:
4.2  The emission permit market
Inverting the profit-maximization condition in (22) defines emissions in industry i as a 
function of the price p for emission permits:
where (f �
i
)−1 is the inverse function of f ′
i
 . Inserting the demand functions (23) into 
the equilibrium condition (20) yields
This equation defines the price for emission permits, p, as a decreasing function of 
aggregate emissions M:
Inserting (24) into (22) yields the profit Πi of industry i as a function of emission 
permits Mi for that industry and aggregate emissions M:
(20)∫
1
0
mkdk = ∫
1
0
Midi = M.
(21)Πi ≐ fi(mi) + p(Mi − mi).
(22)Πi = max
mi
[fi(mi) − pmi] + pMi and p = f
�
i
(mi) with
dp
dmi
≐ f ��
i
< 0.
(23)mi = Ni(p) ≐ (f �i )−1(p) with N�i ≐ 1∕f ��i < 0,
M ≐ �
1
0
Midi = �
1
0
mkdk = �
1
0
Nk(p)dk.
(24)p(M) with p
� =
dp
dM
=
1
∫ 1
0
N�
k
dk
=
1
∫ 1
0
dk
f ��
k
< 0.
(25)
Πi(Mi,M) ≐ max
mi
[
fi(mi) − p(M)mi
]
+ p(M)Mi,
휕Πi
휕Mi
= p,
휕Πi
휕M
= (Mi − mi)p
�.
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Plugging (24) into (23) defines emissions mi of industry i ∈ [0, 1] as an increasing 
function of aggregate emissions M:
where m′
i
 is the proportion of aggregate emission permits M that ends up as emis-
sions in industry i. In vector form, the result (26) is given by
Industry i ∈ [0, 1] consumes its income (25) minus its political contributions RiT (퐌) 
to the regulator:4
Noting consumption (28) for all industries i ∈ [0, 1] , the regulator’s utility (11) with 
traded permits can be written as follows [cf. (27)]:
4.3  Regulation
In contrast to the equilibrium conditions (a)–(d) in the preceding section, a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium for the game with emissions permit trading is a policy 퐌 
and a set of contribution schedules RiT (퐌) such that condition (a) is preserved, but 
conditions (b’)–(d’) are revised: 
(b’)  Industry i cannot have a feasible strategy RiT (퐌) that yields it higher utility 
UiT than in equilibrium [cf. (27)]: 
(c’)  The regulator cannot have a policy 퐌 that yields it higher utility (29) than in 
equilibrium: 
(26)mi(M) ≐ Ni(p(M)),m�i ≐ N�i p� = 1
f ��
i
∫ 1
0
dk
f ��
k
∈ (0, 1), �
1
0
m�
i
di = 1,
(27)퐦(M) ≐ {mi(M)| i ∈ [0, 1]}, m�i ∈ (0, 1), �
1
0
m�
i
di = 1.
(28)ciT = Πi(Mi,M) − RiT (퐌).
(29)ΩT = ∫
1
0
[
Πk
(
Mk,M
)
+ (z − 1)RkT (퐌)
]
dk − D
(
퐦(M)
)
.
(30)
Mi = arg max
Mi s.t. (20) and (28)
UiT
= arg max
Mi s.t. M=∫ 10 Mkdk
[Πi
(
Mi,M
)
− RiT (퐌) − Di
(
퐦(M)
)]
.
(31)
퐌 = argmax
퐌
ΩT
= argmax
퐌 ∫
1
0
[
Πk
(
Mk,M
)
+ (z − 1)RkT (퐌)
]
dk − D
(
퐦(M)
)
.
4 Subscript T denotes the case of emission permit trading.
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(d’)  Industry i provides the regulator at least with the level of utility than in the 
case it offers nothing ( RiT = 0 ), and the regulator responds optimally given 
the contribution functions of the other industries, 
4.4  Equilibrium
If industry i ∈ [0, 1] does not join the regulatory program, then it has no contributions 
to pay, RiT = 0 , uses the maximum input mi [cf. (3)] and consumes revenue fi(mi) 
minus its penalty ni:
If it joins the program, then it pays contributions RiT (퐌) and consumes (28). In that 
case, by (20), (25) and (28), the condition (30) yields
These contribution schedules are locally truthful. This concept can be extended to a 
globally truthful contribution schedule that represents the preferences of industry i 
at all relevant policy points [cf. (20), (32) and (33)]:
ΩT ≥ max
퐌
ΩT
||RiT=0.
(32)ciT ||RiT=0= fi(mi) − ni.
(33)
𝜕UiT
𝜕Mi
=
𝜕Πi
𝜕Mi
+
(
𝜕Πi
𝜕M
− ∫
1
0
𝜕Di
𝜕mk
m�
k
dk
)
𝜕M
𝜕Mi
−
𝜕RiT
𝜕Mi
=
𝜕Πi
𝜕Mi
+
𝜕Πi
𝜕M
− ∫
1
0
𝜕Di
𝜕mk
m�
k
dk −
𝜕RiT
𝜕Mi
= p + (Mi − mi)p
� − ∫
1
0
𝜕Di
𝜕mk
m�
k
dk −
𝜕RiT
𝜕Mi
= 0
⇔
𝜕RiT (퐌)
𝜕Mi
= p(M) + (Mi − mi)p
�(M) − ∫
1
0
𝜕Di
𝜕mk
(퐦)m�
k
dk
for RiT > 0 and i ∈ [0, 1].
(34)
RiT (퐌) = �
휕RiT (퐌)
휕Mi
dMi
= max
{
Πi(Mi,M) − Di
(
퐦(M)
)
− [fi(mi) − ni], 0
}
with
휕RiT
휕Mi
= p + (Mi − mi)p
� − �
1
0
휕Di
휕mq
m�
q
dq
and
휕RiT
휕Mk
= (Mi − mi)p
� − �
1
0
휕Di
휕mq
m�
q
dq for k ≠ i,
1 3
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where the integration constant fi(mi) − ni is the opportunity income for industry i 
as a free rider [cf. (32)]. By (6), (20), (22), (25), (26), (28) and (34), the equilibrium 
condition (31) yields
(35)
휕ΩT
휕Mi
=
휕Πi
휕Mi
+ �
1
0
{
(z − 1)
휕RkT
휕Mi
+
[
휕Πk
휕M
− �
1
0
휕Dk
휕mq
m�
q
dq
]
휕M
휕Mk
⏟ ⏟
=1
}
dk
=
휕Πi
휕Mi
+ �
1
0
[
(z − 1)
휕RkT
휕Mi
+
휕Πk
휕M
− �
1
0
휕Dk
휕mq
m�
q
dq
]
dk
=
휕Πi
휕Mi
+ (z − 1)
휕RiT
휕Mi
+
휕Πi
휕M
− �
1
0
휕Di
휕mq
m�
q
dq
+ �k≠i
[
(z − 1)
휕RkT
휕Mi
+
휕Πk
휕M
− �
1
0
휕Dk
휕mq
m�
q
dq
]
dk
= p + (z − 1)
휕RiT
휕Mi
+ (Mi − mi)p
� − �
1
0
휕Di
휕mq
m�
q
dq
+ �k≠i
[
(z − 1)
휕RkT
휕Mi
+ (Mk − mk)p
� − �
1
0
휕Dk
휕mq
m�
q
dq
]
dk
= z
휕RiT
휕Mi
+ p −
휕RiT
휕Mi
+ (Mi − mi)p
� − �
1
0
휕Di
휕mq
m�
q
dq
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
=0
+ �k≠i
[
z
휕RkT
휕Mi
−
휕RkT
휕Mi
+ (Mk − mk)p
� − �
1
0
휕Dk
휕mq
m�
q
dq
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
=0
]
dk
= z
[
휕RiT
휕Mi
+ �k≠i
휕RkT
휕Mi
dk
]
= z
{
p + (Mi − mi)p
� − �
1
0
휕Di
휕mq
m�
q
dq
+ �k≠i
[
(Mk − mk)p
� − �
1
0
휕Dk
휕mq
m�
q
dq
]
dk
}
= z
[
p − �
1
0
휕Di
휕mq
m�
q
dq + p� �
1
0
(Mk − mk)dk
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
=0
−�k≠i �
1
0
휕Dk
휕mq
m�
q
dq dk
]
= z
[
p − �
1
0
휕Di
휕mq
m�
q
dq − �k≠i �
1
0
휕Dk
휕mq
m�
q
dq dk
]
= z
[
p − �
1
k=0 �
1
0
휕Dk
휕mq
m�
q
dq dk
]
= z
[
p − �
1
0
(
�
1
0
휕Dk
휕mq
dk
)
m�
q
dq
]
= z
(
p − �
1
0
휕D
휕mq
m�
q
dq
)
= 0 ⇔ f �
i
= p = �
1
0
휕D
휕mq
m�
q
dq ≠ 휕D
휕mi
for i ∈ [0, 1],
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where m′
q
휕D
휕mq
 is the marginal damage of industry q, m′
q
 the relative weight of industry 
q [cf. (27)] and ∫ 1
0
휕D
휕mq
m′
q
dq is the weighted average of the marginal damages of all 
industries q ∈ [0, 1].
5  Emission permit trading
The comparison of outcomes (8), (19) and (35) yields the following result:
Proposition 2 The introduction of inter-industry emission permit trading violates 
the Pareto-optimality conditions (8), decreasing social welfare W.
The efficiency of industry-specific emission capping is based on the possibility 
to set lower caps for more damaging production. When emission permit trading 
lets individual firms to even out their marginal products of emitting inputs in the 
market (i.e., fi = p ), the regulator can effectively control only aggregate emis-
sions M, but not the distribution of these over the industries.
The weighted average of the marginal damages of all industries,∫ 1
0
휕D
휕mq
m′
q
dq , 
divides the industries into two groups:
• I call industry i dirty, if an increase in its energy input damages more than on 
the average, 𝜕D
𝜕mi
> ∫ 1
0
𝜕D
𝜕mq
m′
q
dq.
• I call industry i clean, if an increase in its energy input damages less than on 
the average, 𝜕D
𝜕mi
< ∫ 1
0
𝜕D
𝜕mq
m′
q
dq.
Assume that the economy is originally at the Pareto optimum, f �
i
=
휕D
휕mi
 for 
i ∈ [0, 1] . Then, by f ′′
i
< 0 [cf. (3)] and (35), the introduction of emission permit 
trading causes the following:
• If industry i dirty, 𝜕D
𝜕mi
> ∫ 1
0
𝜕D
𝜕mq
m′
q
dq , then marginal damage f ′
i
 decreases from 
휕D
휕mi
 to ∫ 1
0
휕D
휕mq
m′
q
dq , increasing both the input of carbon energy, mi , and output 
fi(mi) in that industry.
• If industry i clean, 𝜕D
𝜕mi
< ∫ 1
0
𝜕D
𝜕mq
m′
q
dq , then marginal damage f ′
i
 increases from 
휕D
휕mi
 to ∫ 1
0
휕D
휕mq
m′
q
dq , decreasing both the input of carbon energy, mi , and output 
fi(mi) in that industry.
This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 3 Emission permit trading generates pollution by increasing the use of 
carbon energy in dirty and decreasing that in clean industries.
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The effectiveness of emission policy is based on discrimination between dirty and 
clean industries. It falls, when the firms get an opportunity to equalize their marginal 
products of carbon energy in a competitive market.
6  Conclusions
Because aggregate emissions harm welfare, a regulator controls this externality by 
granting industry-specific emission permits. The regulator receives political contri-
butions from the industries for its policy, but takes also social welfare into account 
to promote its survival. In this setup, emission permit trading has the following 
consequences.
The incumbent regulator maximizes the weighted sum of its individual income 
and social welfare that promotes its survival over time. An increase in emission 
permits increases its income, but decreases social welfare and its likelihood of sur-
vival. When emission permits are nontraded, they determine the energy inputs for 
all industries. In that case, in line with Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit et al. 
(1997) and Aidt (1998), there is an efficient lobbying outcome that maximizes social 
welfare.
Emission permit trading between the industries changes the situation fundamen-
tally, because the lobbies representing industries have no way to control firms oper-
ating in their area. When a single firm gets an opportunity to buy and sell emis-
sion permits in a competitive market, it adjusts its marginal output of carbon energy 
equal to the market price. Consequently, the firms equalize the marginal products of 
the emitting inputs in the market. In that case, the regulator can effectively control 
only aggregate emissions but not the distribution of these over the industries.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized game-
theoretic model is used to explain international environmental policy, the following 
judgement seems nevertheless to be justified. If it is impossible to use incentive-
based instruments, and if firms are independent of industrial lobbies, then attempts 
to improve the working of industry-specific emission caps by inter-industry trading 
opportunities can be counterproductive.
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